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I. INTRODUCTION
American political and legal thought is currently in turmoil re-
garding the propriety of various legal theories and governmental ac-
tions designed to provide express benefits and advantages to members
of groups which historically have been the victims of culturally-sanc-
tioned discriminations-the body of thought and law which are
grouped under the label of affirmative action.1 As affirmative action
policies evolved, various legislative bodies have provided benefits to
Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAw REVIEW.
Professor of Law, The University of Toledo College of Law. J.D., Columbia Uni-
versity School of Law (1975); B-A., University of Notre Dame (1972).
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1. See, e.g., Paul N. Cox, The Supreme Court, Title VII and 'Voluntary'Affirmative
Action-A Critique, 21 IND. L. Rv. 767 (1988); Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded
Debate Over Affirmative Action, 82 CAL. L. REv. 893 (1994); Janine S. Hiller &
Stephen P. Farris, Separating Myth From Reality: An Economic Analysis of Vol-
untary Affirmative Action Programs, 23 MZm. ST. U. L. Rv. 773 (1993). The
ideas discussed within this Article would be applicable to affirmative action is-
sues based on a status other than race, especially gender. However, this Article
focuses only on racial issues, and affirmative action as used herein is specifically
limited to governmental activity based on race.
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members of minority groups based on race. 2 However, the civil rights
movement which gave birth to racial integration and affirmative ac-
tion is based on a doctrinal construct which innately limits the reach
of affirmative action and inherently provides the arguments for its
abolition.
In the 1950's and 1960's, proponents of civil rights effectively ap-
pealed to the image of America as a country committed to the concept
of social justice, a society whose laws always reflected a concern for
standards of morality and equality.3 During that period, legal
thought almost unquestioningly defined the primary tenet of social
justice as fairness to each individual citizen.4 The demands of moral-
ity and equality would therefore be satiated if the government en-
sured fairness to everyone regardless of color. The merging of social
justice with fairness was appropriate for a movement that was seek-
ing to eliminate blatant, on-the-face discrimination sanctioned by law.
Although pernicious in its effects and difficult to destroy, the elimi-
nation of expressed historical discrimination required courage and an
increased social consciousness more than sophisticated legal theory or
2. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1988)); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-
110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965)(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 et seq. (1988));
Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988)); Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972); Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
284, §§ 801-809, 82 Stat. 73 (1968); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-
2000h-6 (1988)). The term legislative bodies, as used herein, is not restricted to
governmental legislatures, but encompasses any group or individual establishing
substantive rules (e.g. hiring practices) for an entity, group or institution, includ-
ing faculties or hiring committees.
3. Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward A Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Origi-
nal Understandings, 1991 DUxE L.J. 39, 49-50 (describing the effort to achieve
equal justice through the court system); Barbara J. Flagg, 'Was Blind, But Now I
See" White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91
MICH. L. REv. 953, 1013 (1993)("Rejecting racial distinctions seemed the natural
avenue to reversing that history of oppression and achieving racial justice, espe-
cially during the 'Second Reconstruction' of the 1950s and 1960s; colorblindness
appeared to be the exact antithesis of the form of race consciousness that had
been the root cause of racial subordination."); Gary Peller, Race Consciousness,
1990 Dui L.J. 758, 836.
4. For a well-known conception of fairness as equated with justice, see JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 342-43 (1971). See also ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE, AFTER
VIRTUE (1981).
Liberal writers such as Ronald Dworkin invite us to see the Supreme
Court's function as that of involving a set of consistent principles... of
moral import, in light of which particular laws and... decisions are to be
evaluated.... But... one function of the Supreme Court must be to keep
the peace between rival social groups adhering to... incompatible prin-
ciples of justice by displaying a fairness which consists in even-handed-




intellectually difficult legal analysis. The modern Constitution's toler-
ation of inequality candidly based on race was essentially resolved
within the context of the straightforward moral imperative of right
and wrong.5 Arguments grounded in the assertion of fairness re-
flected the moral nature of the debate by keeping the jurisprudential
analysis simple, but also provided the basis for judicial opinions which
had the appearance of an objective legal principle rather than a sub-
jective moral interpretation.6 However, after the applications of fair-
ness had ultimately carried the day and eliminated blatant
discriminations from the face of the law, issues regarding racial equal-
ity became more complex. The resolution of controversies such as de
facto discrimination and affirmative action mandates a balancing of
conflicting, but legitimate, policies and interests which, in turn, re-
quires more sophisticated legal concepts. 7 In this modern equality cli-
mate, the simplistic notions of fairness have proven inadequate as a
basis for establishing meaningful social justice and satisfying the full
dictates of morality and equality.
The prioritization of fairness had its modern origin in the theories
of the legal process scholars whose thought dominated legal reasoning
in the post-World War II era. These writers perceived fairness as be-
ing embodied within the concept of neutral principles. 8 Law would be
fair if every dispute was resolved by an expressed reference to an ob-
jective belief or conceptualization which would provide a natural
guidepost for the resolution of similar cases.9 These articulated prin-
ciples would then constitute the body of an easily administered system
of precedent. Stare decisis, as so understood, would therefore elimi-
nate the perceived major flaws of the legal theories which had domi-
nated American jurisprudence prior to legal process-the bias and
subjectivity of the natural lawlO and the anarchy and moral relativism
5. See Michel Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive
Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1729, 1742 (1989); Larry G.
Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Inter-
pretation Be Justified?, 73 CAL. L. Rlv. 1482, 1490 (1985)(claiming that a moral
argument is one that is required by justice or fairness).
6. See RAwLs, supra note 4. See also Shelby Steele, A Negative Vote on Affirmative
Action, N.Y. Tnms MAG., May 13, 1990, at 46 ("In theory, affirmative action cer-
tainly has all the moral symmetry that fairness requires.").
7. Rosenfeld, supra note 5, at 1743.
8. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L.
Rv. 1 (1959). See also Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571, 596
(1987)(claiming that "[t]he idea of fairness as consistency forms the bedrock of a
great deal of thinking about morality").
9. John C.P. Goldberg, Community and the Common Law Judge: Reconstructing
Cardozo's Theoretical Writings, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 1324, 1350 (1990)(explaining
fairness as "exist[ing] when a regime of laws is applied to similar situations over
time with reasonable consistency. Such consistency is required if citizens are to
regulate their behavior in accordance with the declared law.").
10. Wechsler, supra note 8, at 9-10.
1995]
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of legal positivism and legal realism.31 Fairness was both administra-
tively efficient and morally correct in the minds of legal process
writers.
The beliefs of the legal process scholars blended perfectly with the
social realities of the post-World War II era. Many influential jurists
or legal philosophers were immigrants or the children of immigrants
who had fled poverty and/or oppressive legal systems.' 2 As such, their
beliefs were influenced by their perspective as both victims of judicial
tyranny and outsiders regarding mainstream American society. From
such a viewpoint, they tended to be wary of equity and/or judicial dis-
cretion and were attracted to a doctrine which promised fairness and
an objective interpretation of the law.1S At the same time, racial mi-
norities and allied legal theorists became increasingly vocal in their
desire to eliminate legally sanctioned discrimination. These civil
rights advocates also did not perceive themselves as being part of the
societal mainstream in America.'4 They shared with the immigrants
a distrust of judicial discretion and concepts of judge-imposed equity
which aroused either the suspicion or reality that a judge is likely to
favor his own group or to be biased in favor of established societal
norms.1 5 Therefore, civil rights advocates also gravitated towards a
legal construct which mandated an objective process or procedure
11. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME CouRT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 81-83
(1970). Some scholars believe that legal realism is related to, or a part of, legal
positivism; others describe it as a distinct movement often opposed to positivism.
See Phillip J. Closius, Rejecting the Fruits of Action: The Regeneration of the
Waste Land's Legal System, 71 NoTRE DAm L. REV. 127, 144-45 (1995).
12. Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism: Ad-
dressing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven Multi-
racial Society, 81 CAL. L. REv. 863 (1993). For an article discussing the life of an
immigrant/scholar, see James R. McCall, Roger Traynor: Teacher, Jurist, and
Friend, 35 HAsTINGs L.J. 741 (1984).
13. Laurence J. Aurbach, Federalism in the Global Millennium, 26 URB. LAw. 235
(Spring, 1994)CAs immigrant groups came to America, they became Americans
with a general sense of toleration, fairness, and civility toward others, while re-
taining various degrees of national identity.").
14. See Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DmcGo L. RE.v. 133, 168
(1994)("If the opponents of discrimination and proponents of affirmative action
become more confident that their values are shared by most Americans, perhaps
they will become more pragmatic and critical about the means of achieving their
ends.").
15. This distrust was reinforced by the massive resistance to the integration impera-
tive derived from Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), by judges in
Southern state courts, Southern school boards and other governmental entities in
Southern states. See generally J. W. PELTASON, 58 LONELY MEN (1971). This sus-
picion has been increased by the Supreme Court's affirmative action decisions.
See Robert C. Power, Affirmative Action and Judicial Incoherence, 55 OIO ST.
L.J. 79, 146 (1994)(describing how the Supreme Court Justices are influenced by
their own values in affirmative action decisions and their views are not always
consistent within the Court or with a majority of the public).
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which would apply equally to any party involved in a dispute or seek-
ing a benefit. These notions were strongly re-enforced by the observa-
tion that legal systems dominated by theories of natural law, legal
positivism or legal realism had at least allowed, if not sanctioned, bla-
tant discriminations to exist.' 6 Finally, the emergence of the federal
government and the growth of the economy dictated that the country
in general, and the law in particular, become more national and less
local in its scope.' 7 Businessmen desired a certainty in the law that
would produce a national body of rules and procedures ensuring a
known, consistent treatment rather than varied and unknown local
customs and discretion. Therefore, immigration, the civil rights move-
ment and nationalization all combined to produce an atmosphere of
distrust of judicial discretion which was perceived as disfavoring "out-
siders" and permitting subjective bias to rule.18 All of these move-
ments believed that more certainty and rigidity and less discretion
and flexibility would further their interests and advance the cause of
fairness.
These legal theories and social realities found a natural means of
expression in two Constitutional clauses that theretofore had been of
little utility and application-equal protection19 and procedural due
process. 20 The core assumption of equal protection is that similarly
situated individuals would receive similar treatment from the law
and/or government.2 ' Equal protection also supported and was sup-
ported by a vision of fairness which mandated that cases or fact pat-
terns which appeared similar be given like results. In a parallel
development, a national standard of procedural due process insured a
consistent, objective treatment for all citizens in all parts of the coun-
try. An emphasis on process would guarantee a systemic understand-
ing that procedures must satisfy a national minimum of fairness.22
Since equal protection and procedural due process had not received
extensive use and/or consideration in American law prior to World
16. See generally Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Impact of Hobbes's Empirical Nat-
ural Law on Title Vii's Effectiveness: A Hegelian Critique, 25 CONN. L. REv. 607
(1993).
17. See, for example, the Commerce Clause cases, especially Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937).
18. See RIcHARD A. POSNER, EcoNoIAc ANALYSIS OF LAw, 261-64 (4th ed. 1992); HER-
BERT WECHSLER, PRINcIPLEs, PoLrrics AND FUNDAmNTAL LAW 13-20 (1961).
19. U.S. CoNST. amend. XV, § 1.
20. Id.
21. Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL.
L. REv. 341 (1949).
22. RAwLS, supra note 4, at 3 (explaining that fairness is a procedural fairness that




War 11,23 neither legal tool had been subject to an extensive amount of
interpretation or an established body of decided case law. Therefore,
aside from overtones of Plessey v. Ferguson and its progeny, there was
no direct body of precedent that needed to be overruled or ignored.24
A strict application of stare decisis would thereafter safeguard sys-
temic fairness by assuring that similar fact patterns would receive
similar treatment regardless of the personal traits or beliefs of the
human beings involved in the lawsuit and the creation and/or inter-
pretation of the law. As such, definitions of fairness increasingly em-
phasized the importance of an objective procedure consistently
applied. The twin doctrines of equal protection and procedural due
process were also appealing because they were simple and superficial.
In a struggle characterized as good versus evil, constitutional doc-
trines which seemed to contain clear, straight forward answers-treat
everyone similarly, establish a known, national standard for judicial
process-were irresistibly attractive. 25
The application and development of this conception of fairness has
distorted a complete realization of social justice. Social justice is pro-
duced by a broad application of common values and the maintenance
of a feeling of community.2 6 In such a setting, being fair is a compo-
nent value which exists with, and is frequently subservient to, other
values such as compassion, empathy and trust.27 The primacy of fair-
23. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 326 (1978)(Brennan, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
24. Id.
25. Goldberg, supra note 9, 1350 (Cardozo "thought that the doctrine of stare decisis,
whatever its shortcomings, achieves three important goals which might be la-
beled fairness, legitimacy, and justice."). See also Michel Rosenfeld, supra note 5,
at 1742-43; Steven F. Williams, Court-Gazing, 91 Micu. L. REv. 1158, 1159
(1993)(reviewing DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGrr: THE MAING OF THE REIHN-
QUIST SUPREM COURT (1992))("Can Savage really think that fairness and consis-
tency naturally conflict? Isn't treating like cases alike a criterion of fairness?").
26. For a good explanation of communitarianism see Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law,
Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90 MIc. L. REv. 685 (1992)(discussing
different meanings of communitarianism and comparing and contrasting them to
liberalism). But cf. RicaARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 414
(1990)(proposing that "liberalism" and "communitarianism" are mutually exclu-
sive theories).
27. Miroslaw Wyrzykowski, Individualism and Communitarianism in a Contempo-
rary Polish Legal System: Tensions and Accommodations, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv.
577 (1993):
The relationship between individualism and communitarianism illus-
trates a permanent tension that is characterized by constant attempts to
find a reasonable balance. In this balancing process, it is first necessary
to find a point of acceptance of legitimate values and interests of individ-
ualism and communitarianism. This is a starting point for rationaliza-
tion and compromise of values and interests.
Id. at 599. See also NANCY L. ROSENBLUm, ANOTHER LIBERALISM: ROmANTICISM
AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF LIBERAL THOUGHT 184 (1987)(relating communitari-
anism with political empathy); Robin West, Law, Rights, and Other Totemic Illu-
[Vol. 74:569
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ness, although well intentioned and productive during its incipient
years, has ultimately produced a legal system which is rigid in its con-
cepts, superficial in its analysis of significant problems, such as bal-
ancing competing valid interests, and, ultimately, unjust in many of
its resolutions.28 Social justice, which, in its long term sense, must
include affirmative action, will produce laws and fact patterns which,
in the short term, will produce decisions which are unfair to specific
individuals. However, the subordination of fairness is permissible,
even constitutionally mandated, within a context of communally de-
fined values.29
As issues of equality have become more complex, the concept of
fairness that fueled equal protection and procedural due process has
an insufficient base in substantive values to provide for long term so-
lutions to difficult problems. Fairness principles have become di-
vorced from the human interests that inspired their creation and have
instead become the philosophical foundation for a legal structure
which glorifies certainty in conceptualization and predictability in ap-
plication. As such, fairness appeals to the perspective of economic effi-
ciency and materialism which dominate modern American society and
its legal system.30 However, in order to maintain validity and vitality,
the law must reaffirm its commitment to communal values rather
than the interests of commercialism, administration and individual-
ism.3 1 Social justice in such a setting demands that certainty be
subordinated to the encouragement of judicial discretion in the weigh-
ing of valid interests in conflict. In order to implement shared commu-
nal values, America must relearn how to trust its lawmakers, judges
and citizens instead of simply demanding that they be predictable. 32
sions: Legal Liberalism and Freud's Theory of the Rule of Law, 134 U. PA. L. REv.
817, 859 (1986)(connecting the endorsement of empathy with feminist and com-
munitarian scholars).
28. Karen B. Jewell, Book Note, 83 MicH. L. REv. 1150, 1153 (1985)(reviewing Lois
G. FoRER, MONEY AND JuSTICE: WHO OWNS THE COURTS? (1984))(criticizing
Forer's notion of due process as essentially a principle of fairness since it is un-
likely that courts can ensure fairness "which reflects no differences in resources,
education, and power, when the rest of society is in large part built upon such
differences"). See also VmOnrA L. WOOD, DUE PROCESS OF LAw 1932-1949: THE
SuPREM COURT'S USE OF A CONsrrtrrONAL TOOL 401 (1951)(criticizing the
Supreme Court's arbitrary use of due process and concepts of fairness and the
lack of a useable standard to determine when such notions should be invoked).
29. Jamie G. Heller, Legal Counseling in the Administrative State: How to Let the
Client Decide, 103 YALE L.J. 2503,2512 (1994) (explaining that according to com-
munitarian principles "individual preferences and claims of right must at times
be subordinated to the public good").
30. See, PosNER, supra note 18, at 12-16; Closius, supra note 11, at 140-42.
31. CORNEL WEST, RACE MArEES 56-57 (1993).
32. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425




The current legal system distorts fairness by exhalting it to a posi-
tion of primacy and by ignoring other values of equal or greater impor-
tance. These values are defined by the moral and philosophical
traditions of the community and include empathy, compassion, self-
sacrifice and the deferment of immediate gratification. Communal
values also include a commitment to be fair, a systemic perspective
which is vastly different from a rigid enforcement of the primacy of
fairness. Fairness, in its current interpretation, emphasizes the indi-
vidual and the immediate-a focus on whether a person is being cur-
rently deprived of a benefit, usually financial.33 A commitment to be
fair perceives an individual's interest in the context of a community
and from a long term perspective.3 4 Therefore, a deprivation of a fi-
nancial opportunity, which may be unfair in a short term understand-
ing, can be consistent with the broader perspective inherent in a
system of communal values, including a commitment to be fair. Social
justice in this communal sense is dependent on lawmakers and judges
who are unshackled from the limitations of short-term fairness and
the restrictions of predictability and certainty and who are trusted to
apply communal values pursuant to a shared vision of long-term socie-
tal best interests. A legal system of this kind can assess valid claims
of antagonistic positions in terms of those values rather than simply
reacting to individualized harm. Such a community can embrace re-
sults which seem unfair in the immediate sense of depriving an indi-
vidual of a financial benefit.
Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. indicates that the foundations of social justice
can be discovered in the Bible and the thought of Karl Marx.3 5 These
same sources help to delineate the subordinated role that fairness
must play within the totality of communal values. A Biblical illustra-
tion of this understanding is the New Testament parable of the Prodi-
gal Son:36
And he said, "A certain man had two sons." And the younger of them said
to his father, "Father, give me the share of the property that falls to me." And
he divided his means between them.
And not many days later, the younger son gathered up all his wealth, and
took his journey into a far country; and there he squandered his fortune in
loose living. And after he had spent all, there came a grievous famine over
that country, and he began himself to suffer want. And he went and joined
33. JoHN H. ELY, D.MocRAcY D DISMUST 87 (1980)(associating fairness with the
resolution of individual disputes). See also Lynda J. Oswald, 70 WASi. L. REv. 91
(1995)(discussing regulatory takings and linking notions of fairness with the in-
fliction of harm on individuals). See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
34. Tony A. Freyer, A Precarious Path: The Bill of Rights After 200 Years, 47 Vs-D.
L. REv. 757, 794 (1994)("The essays exploring... affirmative action suggest the
degree to which rights exist within a community." Such claims have "force in
part because they appeal to a community's norms of fairness.").




one of the citizens of that country, who sent him to his farm to feed swine.
And he longed to fill himself with the pods that the swine were eating, but no
one offered to give them to him.
But when he came to himself, he said, "How many hired men in my father's
house have bread in abundance, while I am perishing here with hunger! I will
get up and go to my father, and will say to him, Father, I have sinned against
heaven and before thee. I am no longer worthy to be called thy son; make me
as one of thy hired men." And he arose and went to his father.
But while he was yet a long way off, his father saw him and was moved
with compassion, and ran and fell upon his neck and kissed him. And the son
said to him, "Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee. I am no
longer worthy to be called thy son." But the father said to his servants, "Fetch
quickly the best robe and put it on him, and give him a ring for his finger and
sandals for his feet; and bring out the fattened calf and kill it, and let us eat
and make merry; because this my son was dead, and has come to life again; he
was lost, and is found." And they began to make merry.
Now his elder son was in the field; and as he came and drew near to the
house, he heard music and dancing. And calling one of the servants he in-
quired what this meant. And he said to him, "Thy brother has come, and thy
father has killed the fattened calf, because he has got him back safe." But he
was angered and would not go.
His father, therefore, came out and began to entreat him. But he answered
and said to his father, "Behold, these many years I have been serving thee,
and have never transgressed one of thy commands; and yet thou hast never
given me a kid that I might make merry with my friends. But when this thy
son comes, who has devoured his means with harlots, thou has killed for him
the fattened calf."
But he said to him, "Son, thou art always with me, and all that is mine is
thine; but we were bound to make merry and rejoice, for this thy brother was
dead, and has come to life; he was lost, and is found."
Fairness dictates sympathy for the elder son who worked loyally
with his father and did not receive a lavish party in his honor. The
celebration in favor of the younger son violates modern notions of fair-
ness. However, the father in the parable displays a sense of social
justice which relies on many values and is deeper than adherence to a
rigid concept of fairness.37 He exhibits a deep love for both his sons
which makes fairness seem petty. He expresses his devotion to his
younger son and his joy at his return by celebrating. He will not allow
the primacy of fairness to his oldest son to dictate the expression of his
love for the younger. However, the father also loves his elder son and
this love includes a commitment to be fair to him. This broader com-
mitment is reflected by the father's expression that everything he pos-
sesses belongs to the elder son.38 A value system which includes a
commitment to be fair demands a long term perspective and a broader
vision of daily events; a system based on the primacy of fairness will






Another parable which contains a similar insight is the parable of
the Laborers in the Vineyard:39
For the kingdom of heaven is like a householder who went out early in the
morning to hire laborers for his vineyard. And having agreed with the labor-
ers for a denarius a day, he sent them into his vineyard. And about the third
hour, he went out and saw others standing in the market place idle; and he
said to them, "Go you also into the vineyard, and I will give you whatever is
just." So they went. And again he went out about the sixth, and about the
ninth hour, and did as before. But about the eleventh hour he went out and
found others standing about, and he said to them, "Why do you stand here all
day idle?" They said to him, "Because no man has hired us." He said to them,
"Go you also into the vineyard." But when evening had come, the owner of the
vineyard said to his steward, "Call the laborers, and pay them their wages,
beginning from the last even to the first." Now when they of the eleventh hour
came, they received each a denarius. And when the first in their turn came,
they thought that they would receive more; but they also received each his
denarius. And on receiving it, they began to murmur against the householder,
saying, "These last have worked a single hour, and thou hast put them on a
level with us, who have borne the burden of the day's heat."
But answering one of them, he said, "Friend, I do thee no injustice; didst
thou not agree with me for a denarius? Take what is thine and go; I choose to
give to this last even as to thee. Have I not a right to do what I choose? Or art
thou envious because I am generous?" Even so the last shall be first, and the
first last; for many are called, but few are chosen.
In a reaction similar to that of the parable of the Prodigal Son,
adherents of fairness would argue that the householder is unfair be-
cause the laborers who worked more hours should be paid more. In
such a perspective, the householder undermines individual merit and
achievement by paying the same amount of money for less work.40
However, the parable clearly prioritizes the value of generosity over a
rigid application of fairness. The householder still maintains a com-
mitment to be fair as part of his values (as evidenced by his statement
"Friend, I do thee no injustice. . ."),41 but this produces a long term
perspective informed by other values, not the short term result de-
manded by the laborers' sense of fairness. The communal good and
the importance of other values supersede the materialism inherent in
fairness. The dictates of economic efficiency are subordinated to
higher values within the culture.
Karl Marx embodied this distinction in the phrase "From each ac-
cording to his ability, to each according to his need."42 Modern West-
ern capitalism and the single-minded devotion to economic efficiency
39. Matthew 20:1-16.
40. See the reference to this perception in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S.
547, 604 (1990)(affirmative action "[M]ay create considerable tension with the
Nation's widely shared commitment to evaluating individuals upon their individ-
ual merit.").
41. Matthew 20:13.
42. Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program, in TIM MARX-ENGELS READER 388
(Robert C. Tucker ed., 1st ed. 1972).
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which drive it have rejected this Marxian advice as a viable basis for
establishing an economy. In addition to other critiques, capitalism
perceives this admonition as a grotesque violation of fairness-indi-
vidual ability, merit and achievement must be financially rewarded
for the system to be economically efficient.43 However, Marx envi-
sions a society which is committed to a value system much broader in
scope than fairness and/or efficiency, one in which the commitment to
be fair merges with compassion and empathy to produce an allocation
of wealth and resources different from that dictated by a system based
on fairness and efficiency.44
William Shakespeare makes a similar point in Hamlet. Hamlet is
discussing with Polonius how an individual should treat and show re-
spect for others (here, the members of a troupe of travelling players):
Polonius. My lord, I will use them according to their desert.
Hamlet. God's bodkins, man, much, better! Use every man after his desert,
and who should 'scape whipping? Use them after your own honor and dignity.
The less they deserve, the more merit is in your bounty. Take them in.45
Polonius, the embodiment of efficiency and material success, believes
that he is being morally correct by treating people with fairness. Fair-
ness, as he interprets it, dictates that everyone be treated as they de-
serve.46 Hamlet rejects this rigid application of fairness by noting
43. See, e.g., DwIGHT R. LEE & RimHAE B. McKENzIE, FAILURAE D PRoGREss: THE
BRmGrT SIDE OF TE Dismi. SCIENCE 65, 69 (1993)(explaining why the authors
"believe it is a mistake for economists to dismiss fairness as not being a legiti-
mate economic concern").
44. See Michael Ignatieff, Falling Apart and Coming Together: Russia and Europe in
the 1990s, 93 QUEENS Q. 804, 808 (1991)(discussing Marxist ideology and its
promise of social justice and fair outcomes); Michael K Ross, Book Note, 90 MICH.
L. REv. 1356 (1992)(reviewing BRON R. TAYLOR, AFFinATivE ACTION AT WORC
LAw, POLrriCS AND ETmCs (1991)(connecting Marxist theory with distributive
fairness). For commentary on the problems with instrumental Marxism from the
CLS' point of view and the resulting need for law to appear fair and equal, see
Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE PoLmrrs OF LAw:
A PROGRESSIV CRrIQUE 281, 288 (David Kairys ed., 1982).
45. WILmma SHAKESPEARE, HAL EIT act 2, sc. 2 at 552-558.
46. This perspective of Polonius and its contrast with the insight of Hamlet can also
be illustrated in the field of criminal law, specifically the exclusionary rule. In
considering whether evidence obtained illegally by the police should be admissi-
ble against a criminal defendant, much of the current debate concentrates on
whether Warren Court precedent should be overturned or whether "guilty"
criminals should be set free in society because of "technicalities." Neither of these
analysis deal with the substance of the problem and neither will significantly
help in addressing crime or producing fair treatment for criminals. Precedent
should be overruled or applied differently when the shared values of society so
dictate. Concern for letting the guilty go free is, to paraphrase Hamlet, only con-
centrating on treating people as they "deserve" to be treated or lusting for re-
venge. The legal system should treat criminals as the honor and dignity of
American society dictates individuals be treated, not as they deserve. Focusing
on the type of police force a vibrant community desires will ultimately produce a
more just society than concentrating on the treatment criminals deserve.
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that a commitment to a broader value system dictates that people who
do not deserve it should receive more understanding and generosity.
The long term perspective dictates that individuals should be treated
as the actor's (or society's) honor and dignity demand.47 Therefore,
rather than trying to treat like individuals similarly or attempting to
ascertain an individual's past conduct to discover the treatment he/
she deserves, a person or community should try to define its value sys-
tem and then treat others as those values dictate.48 In such a system,
being fair is a component of a long term value system which empowers
justice by truly accounting for broader based societal influences and
conditions which are frequently ignored in a system of fairness.
This Article shall examine the characteristics of the current ana-
lytical framework by first examining some harmful effects resulting
from the prioritization of fairness: excessive generalization,49 formal-
ism and superficiality,o and materialism.51 The Article will then ex-
amine in detail the Supreme Court's resolution of modem affirmative
action issues. 52 The Court has generated confusion and discord by ap-
plying simplistic concepts to complex problems and by adhering to the
primacy of fairness in a context in which all interested parties claim
that fairness favors their result. Finally, this Article will critique the
Court's inability to provide a consistent doctrinal basis for discussing
affirmative action issues and will propose a framework for the resolu-
47. The abortion debate provides some insights into this problem. The non-litigant
participants in the controversy-be they pro-life or pro-choice-seem more than
willing to base their positions and the ensuing discussion on values and the na-
ture of modern societal values within this context. The Supreme Court opinions,
however, seem remarkably devoid of this value based discussion. The legal lan-
guage seems preoccupied by concepts such as the primacy of precedent, advances
in medical technology and fitting in changing realities (in the form of new legisla-
tion or medical advances) to the Roe v. Wade structure. To paraphrase Hamlet,
the Supreme Court has provided little direct guidance on how this society's honor
and dignity dictates that the abortion controversy be resolved. See Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
48. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Liberalism, Community, and State Borders, 41 DUKE
L.J. 1 (1991). Brilmayer explains how communitarians designate values:
To a communitarian, the key value is community membership. The com-
munity is both the chief source of political norms and an important
source of personal identity.... Communitarians tend to emphasize the
importance of community traditions in the establishment of political
principles. They reject the possibility of universalist reasoning that
would ground principles valid for all times and places. Political norms
are contextual because norms arise out of the shared history of a particu-
lar community. The personal identities that we come to have, likewise,
can only be appreciated in the context of the communities that shape us.
Id. at 9.
49. See infra notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 87-176 and accompanying text.
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tion of affirmative action issues based on a societal dedication to im-
plement communal values.53 Although a vibrant community must
frequently redefine and reassess its values, the moral and philosophi-
cal traditions of American society provide a foundation for the shared
understanding of these values.54 Such commonality is essential for
any group that considers itself a community. Such a communal value
system will also restore trust-trust in others and trust in govern-
ment.55 The primacy of fairness is, in many ways, the product of a
society that has lost faith in trust.
H. THE EFFECTS OF PRIORITIZING FAIRNESS
The exhaltation of fairness originated in the well-intentioned de-
sire to treat all individuals equally in the eyes of the law.56 This em-
phasis was appropriate for the limited time during which the
American legal system accepted the principle that the Constitution
would not tolerate blatant racial discriminations by the government.
However, as that interim period was successfully concluded, the con-
tinued primacy of fairness has de-valued more important communal
virtues and aspirations which cannot be subordinated for long periods
of time if a community is to remain vibrant and meaningful social jus-
tice is to be achieved.57 The continuing devotion to fairness and its
attendant legal doctrines has ironically warped the American legal
system to the extent that the achievement of social justice is being
impeded by the philosophical construct which defined, in large part,
the modern consciousness of social justice. The rule of fairness has
produced a system which stifles its own raison d'etre by cynically de-
basing more important values and glorifying formalism, superficiality
and materialism.58
53. See infra notes 177-96 and accompanying text.
54. Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 U. PA. L.
REv. 1191, 1207 (1994)(defining communitarianism as encompassing the belief
"[T]hat the existence of a community is essential to personal identity and success-
ful social organization, and that a community is constituted by the shared moral
values of its members."). The tradition which informs communal values in mod-
em America includes the Bible, Shakespeare, Marx and Vonnegut, as noted
herein.
55. See generally Ami ETZmoNI, THE Spmrr OF Comnmeu.rry: RIGHTs, RESPoNsmLI-
TES, AND TE Co ~nurrAmAN AGENDA (1993); Leslie Green, Law, Legitimacy,
and Consent, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 795 (1989).
56. See Stephen Reinhardt, Civil Rights and the New Federal Judiciary: The Retreat
from Fairness, 14 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 142 (1991).
57. Id. at 148-49.
58. Jon 0. Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94
YALE L.J. 1643, 1646 (1985)(explaining that fairness as a standard is the reason




As noted above, fairness has become intimately intertwined with
notions of equal protection and neutral principles.59 This, in turn, has
led to a limited use and understanding of precedent and a pre-occupa-
tion with consistent results. Fairness, as applied through these legal
concepts and devices, dictates that any particular fact pattern be re-
solved by reference to an extrapolated rule or principle of general ap-
plication to ensure consistency in the resolution of similar future fact
patterns.60 This constant reference to generalization and consistency
can produce bizarre results in any immediate fact pattern.61 More-
over, consistency-the slavish devotion to a narrow concept of prece-
dent-then becomes the overriding goal of the system at the expense
of a legitimate balancing of competing interests informed by long-term
communal norms. The emphasis on fairness and consistency allows
the concept of social justice to become incredibly distorted as judicial
reasoning shifts from determining a resolution which is just in the
context of the proper values of contemporary American society to pro-
ducing a result consistent with an extrapolated, general principle
which can be derived from fact patterns perceived to be similar.62 The
latter perspective is naturally appealing to any system because the
inquiry demanded is easier to answer, provides more certainty and
predictability for judicial decisions, makes judges and attorneys less
personally responsible and grants the appearance of justice through
the satisfaction of fairness. This appeal is particularly potent in mod-
ern society because legal administration and its attendant results can
then be packaged under the label of efficiency. 63
59. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
60. See Schauer, supra note 8, at 595-602 (arguing that proper respect for precedents
ensures fairness by treating like cases alike).
61. Charles M. Yablon, Law and Metaphysics, 96 YALE L.J. 613, 628 (1987)(book
review):
It may be that we value the attitudes of neutrality, rationality, and def-
erence to precedent independently of whether those attitudes achieve
the correct result. Or perhaps we are willing to say, unlike Kripke and
his bizarre skeptic, that any results achieved through such dispositions
are, by that very fact, correct results.
See also Arthur Kuflik, Majority Rule Procedure, in DuE PaOCESS 296, 316-25 (J.
Roland Pennock et al. eds., 1977)(arguing that "fair procedures" do not always
have just results).
62. See RONALD DwoRmN, TAmING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 113 (1977)("The gravitational
force of a precedent may be explained by appeal, not to the wisdom of enforcing
enactments, but to the fairness of treating like cases alike."); DUNCAN KENNEDY,
LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY, 22-23 (1983). The
Supreme Court has recently stated in the affirmative action context that the gen-
eral propositions which control racial classifications by the government are skep-
ticism, consistency and congruence. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.
Ct. 2907, 2111 (1995).
63. See POSNER, supra note 18, at 261-66.
[Vol. 74:569
MYTH OF FAIRNESS
Ironically, the case which confirmed equal rights under the Consti-
tution for all citizens, regardless of color, Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,64 did not rely on the primacy of fairness and its related concepts.
The Brown opinion clearly did not rely on precedent, consistency or
similar results in equivalent fact patterns to dictate its holding.65
While the Supreme Court did proclaim that segregated schools vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause, the decision is best understood as a
moral statement-a conclusion that segregated schools and the feel-
ings of inferiority they engendered were incompatible with the com-
munal values of modern America.66 This perspective is more
graphically illustrated in the related case of Bolling v. Sharpe.67 In
dealing with segregated schools maintained by the federal govern-
ment (Washington D.C. schools), the Court was theoretically con-
strained from finding a violation of equal protection principles because
the Fifth Amendment does not contain a reference to that clause.68
The Court overcame this anomaly by simply reading the obligations of
equal protection into the Amendment's Due Process Clause, proclaim-
ing that a decision which prevented the states from maintaining seg-
regated schools but allowed the federal government to do so was
simply "unthinkable.69 Years of established legal doctrine were re-
jected in a single opinion because the opposite result, logical and con-
sistent as it may have been, was so divorced from the values of the
country as to be "unthinkable". The values-oriented nature of these
opinions was verified by the Court's per curiam application of their
holdings to diverse fact patterns in the immediately succeeding
years.70 While enforcing the integration mandate, the Court had no
interest in hearing arguments attempting to distinguish fact patterns
or in establishing a consistent link with former precedent.
64. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
65. Wechsler, supra note 8, at 31-34. For these reasons, legal process scholars have
been critical of Brown and the civil rights cases. See Closius, supra note 11, at
153.
66. Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 150 (1955): "So one speaks in
terms of the most familiar and universally accepted standards of right and wrong
when one remarks (1) that racial segregation under government auspices inevita-
bly inflicts humiliation, and (2) that official humiliation of innocent law-abiding
citizens is psychologically injurious and morally evil." Id. at 159.
67. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
68. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
69. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). The Supreme Court has recently
confirmed the implicit demands of equal protection on the federal government
and the similar meaning of such requirements under both the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2907, 2106-
08 (1995).
70. Wechsler, supra note 8, at 26-27.
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B. Formalism and Superficiality
The devotion to fairness has also produced a formalism in the legal
system-a focus on the appearance of fairness, an inability to perceive
substance over procedure. The prioritization of fairness and its re-
lated legal conceptualizations-excessive generalizations, a narrow
interpretation of precedent and a literal interpretation of procedure-
appeals to the infatuation with efficiency which drives much of mod-
ern American thought.71 Fairness is easier to administer than a true
commitment to justice and produces a context for the judicial system
which seems to be based on a value. However, this notion of fairness
is inherently superficial because its scope is necessarily limited.
Treating similarly situated people in a similar manner can never pro-
duce full social justice because of the difficulty in truly assessing simi-
lar situations. For example, fairness cannot account for deep
differences in the background of various individuals subjected to the
legal system-the impoverished, parentless background of an accused
criminal defendant; the sexist, abused upbringing of a rural woman;
the distinctions in education and self-esteem that monied back-
grounds will always produce in the privileged. The gains made by the
early implementation of fairness and equal protection were critically
important to the development of America and the growth of the civil
rights movement. However, these gains dealt with the superficial-
the elimination of conscious, admitted, on-its-face racial discrimina-
tion.72 These doctrines have now become entrapped within the realm
of superficiality they were enlisted to destroy. As discrimination has
become more sophisticated, as judgments have become more complex,
these tools are inadequate devices for establishing social justice. As
valued as they were in their time, a just society for the 21st century
needs to move beyond the restrictions and superficiality inherent in
the primacy of fairness and establish a judicial system based on com-
munal values.
Simple examples illustrate the limitations inevitable in a doctrinal
perspective which exaggerates the importance of fairness. In stan-
dardized testing, fairness and related procedural concerns assure that
questions are not culturally biased, that everyone has the same time
to complete the exam and that the same conditions are generally ap-
plied regardless of the traits or beliefs of the individual takers. How-
ever, modern fairness is too limited in depth to account for the reality
that many wealthy students have been practicing for the tests for
years while many poor students are taking the exam for the first
71. See PosNER, supra note 18, at 12-16.




time.73 Hypothetically, fairness can also be used to police the equality
of the conditions under which a race will be run. However, the per-
spective of fairness is too limited to account for the fact that some run-
ners have trained for a year at an Olympic training facility while
others have not had any training at all. The race would appear to be
run under equal conditions, but the substantive unfairness of unequal
training conditions would be ignored by the superficial nature of an
analysis which prioritizes fairness. Equalized immediate conditions
dictated by fairness do nothing to deal with inherent unfairness con-
cerning deeper societal conditions.74 Fairness is arguably harmful to
the achievement of social justice because it imparts the appearance of
equal conditions to a reality that is incredibly unequal. Fairness and
its application can be effective in combatting superficial discrimina-
tions-e.g. black takers being given a different, and more difficult, test
than whites. However, as discriminations become more subtle, the in-
adequacies of fairness become apparent.
As the commitment to fairness developed within the American
legal system, fairness became increasingly procedural in nature and
found further expression within the notion of procedural due pro-
cess.75 The desire to protect minorities and "outsiders" blended with
the necessity of nationalizing America to produce a broad legal con-
sensus that process be made objective and equally applicable to all.
Fairness would best be served by a rigid interpretation of procedural
due process which would guarantee every American equal treatment
from the applicable governmental entity regardless of color or local
origin.76 Despite such laudatory goals, procedural due process has
contributed to the formalism and superficiality inherent in the pri-
macy of fairness. Procedural rights are expensive and have become a
critical component in any defensive strategy involving delay and cost.
More importantly, procedural due process shifts the legal focus from
underlying substantive concerns to the efficacy of the procedure at is-
73. Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance, and Community Economic Empowerment:
Structural Economic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive Racial
Justice, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1465, (1994).
The equality paradigm suggests that it is beyond the scope of public
policy to remedy inequality that persists after fair and equal procedures
have been established. Thus, procedural fairness has no necessary con-
nection to fair outcomes: lending outcomes are considered beyond ques-
tion as long as lending criteria are arguably rational and clearly non-
racial. In contrast, the affirmative action model maintains that the lin-
gering effects of past discrimination cannot be cured by equal treatment
alone, but only by affirmative steps to make equal opportunity a reality.
Id. at 1484.
74. Jewell, supra note 28, at 1153.
75. See ROBERT NozicK, ANARcHY, STATE AND UToPIA, 93-95 (1974); RAwLs, supra
note 4, at 3.
76. See RAWLs, supra note 4.
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sue.7 7 Although procedural due process is a significant value within
our constitutional framework, the exhaltation of process will not pro-
vide a panacea to the complex issues of equality in a modern society. 78
The primacy of fairness will inexorably lead to a formalism and super-
ficiality which will, among other consequences, ultimately exaggerate
the importance of procedure and exhalt process over substance.
C. Materialism
Undue reliance on fairness will also engender an emphasis on ma-
terialism. In both parables, fairness is the argument used to demand
more money, more material wealth.79 This association with material-
ism also explains the appeal of fairness in the post-World War II world
in which America was striving to build its economy and the children of
immigrants were trying to secure the material advantages of America
for their descendants.80 However, materialism becomes a significant
problem once fairness is transposed from its original context of elimi-
nating governmental or societal disabilities premised on the assump-
tion of racial inferiority to a modem legal environment seeking to
forestall the denial of a financial benefit or opportunity to
majoritarian race individuals. The dictates of fairness should apply
more rigidly regarding the imposition of penalties, or the encourage-
ment of disrespect for individuals or groups, on the basis of race. 81
However, when fairness is applied in the context of the deprivation
of a monetary opportunity (e.g. getting into the graduate school of your
choice or being given a contract), materialism will be encouraged be-
cause, especially in modem society, individuals will always seek more
benefits.82 The primacy of fairness does not ask the value-inspired
question of whether you have enough-it simply justifies a demand
for more.8 3 If a member of a majoritarian racial group fails to obtain a
financial benefit, the denial does not stigmatize the individual in-
77. See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 3. See also Mitchell, supra note 32, at 425.
78. McGeorge Bundy, A Lay View of Due Process, in Gov nursmEr UNDER LAw 363,
378 (Arthur E. Sutherland ed., 1968)(People take due process, which is grounded
in fairness, "for a ride." "Nothing is more natural, and nothing is more dangerous
to the law as a whole."). See also Thomas C. Grey, Procedural Fairness and Sub-
stantive Rights, in DuE PROCESS 182, 182-202 (J. Roland Pennock et al. eds.,
1977)(criticizing the application of procedural fairness in cases regarding sub-
stantive rights created by the decisionmaking institution's own rules and arguing
that only substantive rights with their source outside of a decisionmaking insti-
tution should trigger procedural fairness); Kuflik, supra note 62.
79. See supra notes 36, 39 and accompanying text.
80. See generally POSNER, supra note 18.
81. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 318 (1986)(Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
82. WEST, supra note 31, at 25-27.
83. See WEST, supra note 31, at 44-45.
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volved.84 He may perceive himself as being unfairly deprived of
money, but he is not branded with a governmentally encouraged
badge of inferiority.85 As such, a perspective grounded in the priori-
tization of fairness will shift the focus from the long term interests of
the community to the short term benefits of the individual. In such a
context, materialism, which by nature is individualistic, will be en-
couraged to the detriment of social justice and communal values.
III. THE SUPREME COURT AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
The Supreme Court has wrestled with the complex balancing of
competing interests inherent in affirmative actions cases for nearly 20
years.8 6 The fractured splits of the Justices and the divergence and
multiplicity of opinions in literally all of these decisions testify to the
Court's difficulty in resolving these cases in a manner reflecting some
judicial, never mind public, consensus.
In 1978, the Court began its treatment of affirmative action in Re-
gents of the University of California v. Bakke.87 Allan Bakke had been
denied admission to medical school at the University of California at
Davis while a number of black applicants, with undergraduate grade
point averages and MCAT scores lower than Bakke's, had been admit-
ted pursuant to the schoors affirmative action admissions policies.8S
Bakke's suit alleged, among other claims, that his rejection was based
on race and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.89 Justice Powell's swing opinion decided the
case for a sharply divided Court.90 Powell eventually resolved the
case in Bakke's favor by invalidating Davis' admissions practices as a
84. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 356-59 (1978)(Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85. See id. at 387-389 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
86. The modem treatment of affirmative action cases by the Supreme Court began
with the Bakke decision in 1978. See A Symposium: Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, 67 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1979); Kenneth L. Karst & Harold W.
Horowitz, The Bakke Opinions and Equal Protection Doctrine, 14 HARv. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 7 (1979). This Article does not analyze all of the Supreme Court's
affirmative action decisions but focuses instead on those the author believes to
have the broadest application for establishing the constitutionality of affirmative
action programs. See also Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993); United States v.
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Intl Ass'n v.
EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of
Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979).
87. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
88. Id. at 272-73, 277.
89. Id. at 277-78.
90. Id. at 272. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun concurred in the
judgment but wrote separately to express their deep philosophical disagreement
with Justice Powell. Justices Stevens, Burger, Stewart and Rehnquist concurred
in part and dissented in part.
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constitutionally impermissible racial quota.9 1 He also held that any
racially-based benefit or disadvantage would be subject to the strict
scrutiny test, even if the statute or provision at issue disadvantaged
members of the majoritarian race. 92 However, Powell did conclude
that race could be taken into account by an institution valuing diver-
sity among its students if race was merely a factor considered within
the total mix of an applicant's credentials.93
Powell's opinion at heart resolved the issues of affirmative action
in a manner consistent with the philosophical construct of the legal
process scholars. In denying a governmental actor the ability to rem-
edy the effects of societal discrimination by introducing policies favor-
ing the historically disadvantaged group, Powell relied upon the
unfairness of such a remedy because of the "inequity in forcing inno-
cent persons in respondent's position to bear the burdens of redressing
grievances not of their making."94 In addition, Powell noted the per-
sonal nature of constitutional rights and interpreted that perspective
to mean that the individual had a primacy above any particular group
of which he might be a member.95 Finally, Powell stated that such a
resolution was essential for a consistent application of constitutional
principle which would establish precedent that could be applied in fu-
ture fact patterns of a similar nature.9 6
Justice Brennan's opinion concluded that Davis' admissions poli-
cies did not violate the Equal Protection Clause by holding that an
intermediate standard of review rather than that of strict scrutiny
should apply where benefits or disadvantages were imposed upon
members of the majoritarian race, a group not subjected to historical
discrimination. 97 The judicial standards for such a test mandated
that the practice at issue "must serve important governmental objec-
tives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objec-
tives."9 8 Brennan also noted the validity of a fairness principle that
an imposed burden should bear a relationship to individual responsi-
bility.99 However, Brennan concluded that restrictions which stigma-
tized an individual on the basis of race were really at the heart of
Fourteenth Amendment prohibitions. In the instant case, neither the
black students who were admitted nor Bakke were subject to societal
stigma.10 0 Brennan therefore concluded that, in the absence of such
91. Id. at 319-20.
92. Id. at 290.
93. Id. at 316-19.
94. Id. at 298.
95. Id. at 289.
96. Id. at 299.
97. Id. at 361-62 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
98. Id. at 359 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
99. Id. at 360-61 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
100. Id. at 373-76 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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stigmatization, the burden imposed by the policy was not undue and,
therefore, an attempt to remedy past societal discrimination would
satisfy intermediate scrutiny.10 Brennan tried to appease the dic-
tates of fairness by noting that, if there had been no history of societal
discrimination, blacks would be doing better in school and on stan-
dardized tests and, since Bakke's statistics would be the same, his
scores would be relatively lower and he still would not have been
admitted.l0 2
In Fullilove v. Klutznick, a sharply divided Court again considered
issues of affirmative action.1O3 The federal statute at issue provided
for a mandatory 10% set-aside in favor of defined minority business
enterprises for federally funded public works projects.0 4 The Burger
opinion validated the legislation by characterizing it as a strictly re-
medial law designed to ameliorate proven prior discrimination in the
awarding of public works construction projects.305 Burger further
noted that Congress was entitled to greater deference in matters of
affinmative action than the states or private entities.106 Powell,
although he joined the Burger opinion, wrote separately to note that a
race-based remedy would survive strict scrutiny only when the body
imposing such a remedy had authority to act and had made findings of
past illegal discrimination.307 He also concluded that the burden on
innocents in this case was not great and was "consistent with funda-
mental fairness" because the "marginal unfairness" in the statute was
not sufficiently significant to outweigh the government's remedial in-
terest.l08 Justice Marshall's opinion concluded that, pursuant to the
intermediate standard of review, the minority set-aside was plainly
constitutional and "the question is not even a close one."109 Justice
Stewart's opinion invalidated the legislation as arbitrary and un-
fair.11o He interpreted equal protection to mean that the individual
101. Id. at 376-79 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
102. Id. at 365-66 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
103. Fullilove v. Kiutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). The Syllabus of the opinion indicates
the disparity of opinion on the Court:
BURGER, C.J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an
opinion, in which WHITE and POWELL, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed
a concurring opinion, post p. 495. MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion con-
curring in the judgment, in which BRENNAN and BLACKMJUN, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 517. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 522. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, post, p. 532.
Id. at 452.
104. Id. at 453-55.
105. Id. at 477-78, 481-84.
106. Id. at 472, 480-81.
107. Id. at 498 (Powell, J., concurring).
108. Id. at 515 (Powell, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 526 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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should always be protected from injury or disadvantage based on
race.111 The color-blindness of the Fourteenth Amendment therefore
applied with equal force when the injured persons were not members
of a racial minority.112
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education113 provided the Court with
the opportunity to review an affirmative action provision embodied in
a collective bargaining agreement. The Jackson school board and the
teachers union, in order to safeguard their recent affirmative action
hiring program, agreed that, if teacher layoffs were demanded by eco-
nomic necessity, seniority rules would be subordinated and recently
hired minority teachers would not be laid off.14 Justice Powell's opin-
ion declared the contractual provision to be violative of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. He stated again that ameliorating the effects of
societal discrimination and providing role models for minority stu-
dents suffered from an "indefiniteness" which could not justify the un-
fairness of harming innocents."X5 He perceived the burden imposed
by the layoffs as disruptive and much more intrusive on private lives
than hiring goals.116 Justice O'Connor wrote separately in an effort to
find some common ground in the Court's disparate affirmative action
opinions.117 She noted the dispute on the Court regarding the appli-
cability of the standards of strict scrutiny or intermediate review.' 18
She also stated that race conscious remedies could be imposed without
direct findings of past discrimination or admitted discriminatory prac-
tices if the body imposing the remedy had a "firm basis for believing
that remedial action is required."119 O'Connor concluded that the
non-remedial purposes of ameliorating societal discrimination or pro-
viding role models could not justify the unfairness of the burden which
the layoffs placed on innocents.120
111. Id. at 523 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 524 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
113. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). The Syllabus indicates that the Justices split as follows:
POWELL, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an
opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and REHNQUIST, J., joined, and in all
but Part IV of which O'CONNOR, J., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed an
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 284.
WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 294.
MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and
BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 295. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, post, p. 313.
Id. at 268.
114. Id. at 270-72.
115. Id. at 276.
116. Id. at 281-84.
117. Id. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
118. Id. at 285 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
119. Id. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
120. Id. at 288-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
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Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Wygant reiterated the pro-
priety of the intermediate standard of review and its satisfaction by
the two interests asserted.121 Marshall further noted that the provi-
sion was needed to maintain the integrity of the hiring goals, which
were concededly constitutional and laudatory.122 Justice Stevens' dis-
sent, however, disagreed with the majority on a different basis. He
stated that the Court should not inquire if minority teachers pos-
sessed a special job entitlement as some form of remedy, but rather
should ask if the Board's action advanced the public interest in edu-
cating children regardless of any past discriminations. 1 23 He also per-
ceived a significant constitutional difference between actions which
exclude members of a minority race and policies which include mem-
bers of a minority race.12 4 Inclusive practices, such as the case at bar,
are consistent with the core principles of equality at the heart of the
Fourteenth Amendment.125 However, Stevens further noted that any
race conscious provisions must be adopted and implemented pursuant
to procedures that satisfy the dictates of fairness.12 6 Neither side in
Wygant had disputed that the collective bargaining procedure was un-
questionably fair. Finally, Stevens concluded that the harm caused
Wygant by the layoffs, while significant, was not based on a lack of
respect for her race.12 7 The harm was mainly caused by economic
hardship and could also occur if the Board needed to disrupt seniority
to preserve teachers in a specialty subject in short supply.128
A Southern city's affirmative action plan in the awarding of its
public construction contracts dramatically split the Court in Rich-
mond v. J.A Croson C0.129 The Richmond City Council required
prime contractors on city projects to subcontract at least 30% of the
bid amount to defined minority business enterprises (MBE).'30 An
MBE could be from anywhere in the country and included a number of
racial minorities in addition to African-American.1 31 Justice
O'Connor invalidated the plan pursuant to a strict scrutiny standard
of review.' 3 2 She noted that race-conscious action stigmatized unless
it was clearly remedial in nature. The Richmond Council had been too
general in its findings of past discrimination and its plan was too
121. Id. at 312 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 306 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 316-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 316 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 317-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 318 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 318-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
130. Id. at 477-80. The Plan was similar to the federal set-aside legislation at issue in
Fuflilove v. Klutznick, 488 U.S. 448 (1980).
131. Richmond v. J-A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 478 (1989).
132. Id. at 505-06.
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broad in its scope to be characterized as remedial.133 In addition,
since the Council had a majority of black members, the Plan was not
representative of a majoritarian group imposing disabilities upon it-
self.'3 4 A minority group imposing benefits for itself heightened the
burden on innocents and further violated fairness principles. 35 Jus-
tice Scalia wrote separately to reaffirm his belief that race based
measures could only survive strict scrutiny if they were strictly reme-
dial, such as a court remedying proven illegal discrimination or a state
eliminating its own system based on illegal racial classifications.13 6
Justice Stevens, although concurring, disagreed with O'Connor by
stating that race conscious action was not simply limited to a remedial
context.137 However, unlike Wygant, the city here did not claim that
its function (i.e. efficiency in construction contract awards) would be
enhanced or improved even if past discriminations were disre-
garded.13 8 Stevens also noted that the Plan seemed more appropriate
to judicial rather than legislative action.' 3 9 Finally, Stevens con-
demned the Plan because the groups being advantaged were arguably
from outside the Richmond area and of a racial minority that had
never been in Richmond, negating the possibility of being discrimi-
nated against there.140 The Marshall and Blackmun dissents essen-
tially repeated their belief that remedying generalized past
discrimination or ameliorating societal discrimination justified the
Plan under the intermediate standard of review.141
After a decade of dissent, Justice Brennan authored a majority
opinion in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.142 Congress had provided
by statute that (1) minority ownership should be a plus factor in the
awarding of new radio licenses by the F.C.C. and (2) certain "distress
sales" of existing radio licenses should go exclusively to defined minor-
ity ownership groups.143 The Brennan opinion cited Fullilove for the
proposition that Congress was entitled to special deference as the na-
tional legislature in matters of affirmative action.144 Within that con-
text, the two policies satisfied the intermediate standard of review.'45
In addition, the burden on nonminorities was not undue and could be
133. Id. at 498-504.
134. Id. at 495-96.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 524 (Scalia, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 511 (Stevens, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 512-13 (Stevens, J., concurring).
139. Id. at 513-14 (Stevens, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 514-16 (Stevens, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 535-39 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
142. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
143. Id. at 552-57.
144. Id. at 563.
145. Id. at 563-67.
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characterized as more of a disappointment than a harm.146 Justice
O'Connor's dissent reiterated the disagreement on the Court regard-
ing the appropriate standard of review in affirmative action cases. 147
She argued that the policies were invalid under the strict scrutiny
standard and reaffirmed her belief that such a standard could only be
satisfied by legislation which remedied the effects of identified racial
discrimination.348 She concluded by observing the difficulty in deter-
mining when race conscious efforts were truly benign.149 Aside from
remedial action, O'Connor believed that the Fourteenth Amendment
must be color-blind to protect individuals from benign activity by well
intentioned individuals which are based on stereotypes and are ulti-
mately perceived as pernicious.150 Strict adherence to color-blindness
in non-remedial settings will support "the Nation's widely shared com-
mitment to evaluating individuals upon their individual merit."151
The Court recently reversed its position on Congressional affirma-
tive action legislation as Justice O'Connor authored an opinion for a
sharply divided Court in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.152 The
case was a challenge by Adarand to a series of statutes and regula-
tions which authorized the United States Department of Transporta-
tion (USDOT) to pay money to contractors who employed
146. Id. at 596-600.
147. Id. at 602-04 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 608 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 608-10 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 610 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 604 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In a more recent case, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.
Ct. 2816 (1993), Justice O'Connor spoke for a five person majority declaring a
North Carolina redistricting plan to be in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. O'Connor held that the racial motivation for the construction of an odd-
shaped, black majority district was insufficiently related to a remedial purpose to
satisfy the strict scrutiny standard of review. Id. at 2832. Justices White, Black-
mun, Stevens, and Souter dissented by concluding that, pursuant to prior voting
cases, the white majority plaintiffs had not alleged a cognizable injury. Id. at
2834 (White, J., dissenting).
152. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). The Syllabus again indicated the lack of consensus among
the Justices:
O'CONNOR, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered
an opinion with respect to Parts I, II, III-A, HI-B, III-D, and IV, which
was for the Court except insofar as it might be inconsistent with the
views expressed in the concurrence of SCALIA, J., and an opinion with
respect to Part III-C. Parts I, II, IIl-A, 1II-B, III-D, and IV of that opin-
ion were joined by REHNQUIST, C.J., and KENNEDY and THOMAS,
J.J., and by SCALIA, J., to the extent heretofore indicated; and Part III-
C was joined by KENNEDY, J. SCALIA, J., and THOMAS, J., filed opin-
ions concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. STEVENS, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined. SOUTER, J.,




subcontractors that were small businesses controlled by socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals.153 "Socially disadvantaged"
was defined as "those who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prej-
udice or cultural bias because of their identity as a member of a group
without regard to their individual qualities," and "economically disad-
vantaged" was defined as "socially disadvantaged individuals whose
ability to compete in the free enterprise system has been impaired due
to diminished capital and credit opportunities ... "154 Some ethnic
groups were presumed to be socially disadvantaged, but the maze of
regulations produced uncertainty regarding presumptions of economic
disadvantage.155 Both the presumption or fact of disadvantage in
either or both categories could be rebutted by third parties. 156 Moun-
tain Gravel & Construction Company had been awarded a USDOT
contract for construction of a highway in Colorado.157 Although
Adarand had been the low bidder on the guardrail component of the
project, Mountain Gravel awarded the bid to Gonzales Construction
Company, a qualifying disadvantaged subcontractor. Mountain
Gravel only made such an award because of the USDOT payment for
the selection of Gonzales.158 After this denial, Adarand sued the Sec-
retary of Transportation alleging that it had been denied a benefit on
the basis of race. 159
Justice O'Connor agreed with Adarand that the governmental bur-
den was based on race, not merely disadvantage.160 After reviewing
all the Court's affirmative action decisions, she concluded that the
Court's opinions through Croson established three general principles
controlling the government's use of racial classifications: 1) skepti-
cism-all racial criteria were inherently suspect; 2) consistency-the
standard of review should not change depending on the race of the
burdened; and, 3) congruence-the equal protection analysis applica-
ble to the federal government pursuant to the Fifth Amendment is
identical to the analysis applicable to state governments pursuant to
the Fourteenth Amendment.161 These principles dictated a holding
that any racial classification by either a federal or state governmental
actor be subjected to the highest standard of equal protection review-
strict scrutiny.16 2 The decision in Metro Broadcasting, clearly incon-
sistent with this result, was specifically overruled as being inconsis-
153. Id. at 2101-04.
154. Id. at 2102.
155. Id. at 2103.
156. Id. at 2102-03.
157. Id. at 2102.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2104.
160. Id. at 2105-06.




tent with fifty years of decided case law.163 O'Connor concluded by
reiterating that any governmental benefit or burden based on race
must serve a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tai-
lored to further that interest.164 She again indicated that carefully
drafted legislation designed to remedy specific instances of past dis-
crimination might satisfy the strict scrutiny standard.165
Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred in most of the O'Connor
opinion but wished to offer independent insights. Scalia indicated
that remedying past societal discrimination could never constitute a
"compelling" governmental interest.166 In his view, the Constitution
would not tolerate any concept of a "debtor" or "creditor" race.1 6 7
Scalia concluded by noting that, in the eyes of the government, citi-
zens were all one race-American.168 Justice Thomas wrote to indi-
cate his belief that all governmental activity based on race was
harmful to the minority race. 169 Benign legislation reflected a racial
paternalism which reinforced the badge of racial inferiority con-
demned by the civil rights movement. 170 He concluded that well in-
tentioned motivation was irrelevant in assessing Constitutional harm
and that racial discrimination based on benign prejudice was just as
harmful as discrimination based on malicious prejudice.171
Justice Stevens' dissent agreed with the Court's underlying under-
standing of skepticism, but strenuously disagreed with its interpreta-
tion of consistency and congruence. 172 He found untenable the
majority's assertion that no Constitutional distinction exists between
a majority imposing a burden on a minority race and a majority deci-
sion to redress past discrimination by burdening itself.173 The major-
ity's disregard of benign intent seemed especially inapposite
considering the Court's consistent holding that malicious intent is a
Constitutional requirement to violating equal protection in the con-
text of invidious discrimination.174 Stevens was equally forceful in his
disagreement with the Court's concept of congruence. Congress' sta-
tus as a co-equal branch of government with independent Constitu-
tional authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, its
character as a national legislature providing representation for any
163. Id. at 2112-13, 2115.
164. Id. at 2117.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring).
167. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
168. Id. at 2119 (Scalia, J., concurring).
169. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
170. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
171. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
172. Id. at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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individual who might be burdened by its activity and Congress' his-
toric role as a defender of racial minorities against state oppression
provided an integral basis for treating federal affirmative action dif-
ferent from state activity.175 Stevens concluded by noting that the
only direct precedent, Fullilove and Metro Broadcasting, dictated af-
firmance of a federal scheme which was widely debated and analyzed
in Congress and more broadly inclusive than either of the previous
two plans.1 76
IV. A CRITIQUE AND PROPOSAL
Justices Brennan and Marshall, in their different opinions in
Bakke, both succinctly summarized the heart of the affirmative action
debate as being whether the same Constitution which permitted bla-
tant racial discrimination for 200 years mandated that modern legis-
lative efforts to rectify that historical reality be color-blind.177 The
Supreme Court's answer to this question has been heavily influenced
by its commitment to the primacy of fairness.178 This doctrine, which
assumed its modern form in the civil rights movement of the 1960s,
seemed to be applicable in affirmative action. Imposing a burden on
innocents-individuals who had not directly caused harm to now ad-
vantaged racial minorities-seemed to violate the dictates of fair-
ness.179 Motivated by that analysis, the Court's opinions have
miscast the judicial analysis of affirmative action issues and ignored
the communal values which inspired the civil rights movement, initi-
ated the concept of fairness and provides the only hope for meaningful
social justice.So The on-going debates over the appropriate standard
of review, the intricacies of what constitutes truly remedial activity
and the distinctions between federal and state governmental activity
are all misguided inquiries dictated by the exaggeration of fairness
175. Id. at 2123-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 2127-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Souter's dissent hoped that strict
scrutiny would be more easily satisfied in the affirmative action context and em-
phasized that the majority had not dealt with Congress' power pursuant to Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 2131-34 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Justice Ginsburg's dissent noted that, for most of American history, the govern-
ment did not embrace the "we are all one race" theory. The real issue in affirma-
tive action cases is how to remedy the reality of discrimination. Id. at 2134-36
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
177. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 326-27 (1978)(Brennan and
Marshall, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
178. Aside from considerations of fairness, the remedying of societal discrimination
would seem to clearly support affirmative action policies. See Kathleen L. Bar-
ron, Comment, Color Blind Line: Shaw v. Reno and the Demise of Majority-Mi-
nority Districts, 31 Hous. L. Rev. 889, 916 (1994).
179. See Mark Strasser, The Invidiousness of Invidiousness: On the Supreme Court's
Affirmative Action Jurisprudence, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 323 (1994).
180. See WEST, supra note 31, 55-58.
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and the related notions of procedure and precedent. The confusion
and multiplicity of opinions produced by the Court is reflective of an
analytical structure which is simply inadequate for dealing with the
level of complexity presented by affirmative action issues. Such a fair-
ness-based analysis can no longer even provide the benefits of consis-
tency and certainty which supported its initial prioritization.18'
As the parables indicate, social justice is not compatible with the
primacy of fairness. Social justice requires a variety of values and vir-
tues, with a commitment to be fair simply one such value.182 A na-
tional commitment to undo the wrong of racism requires that the
country acknowledge that, in the spirit of compassion and self-sacri-
fice, some majoritarian race members will be denied some short-term
opportunities. In a strict interpretation of fairness, this result is
surely unfair in that certain individuals will be denied a benefit, usu-
ally financial, even though they are innocent of any direct racial
wrongdoing.1S3 However, individuals will frequently perceive short-
term unfairness if they are denied some material benefit they de-
sire. 84 The issue, therefore, is not whether something is unfair, but
whether communal values locate the perceived unfairness in a long
term context which benefits society. In the spirit of compassion and
self-sacrifice, modern American society should be able to acknowledge
the existence of a limited amount of unfairness which is justified by
the eventual elimination of racism and its effects. Such a long-term
perspective also includes the realization that affirmative action was
conceived as a partial means of redressing 200 years of expressed gov-
ernmental and societal discrimination and as a component of the na-
tional commitment that the system of mandated racial inferiority
would never be reinstituted. These policies were never intended to be
a cure for all of the problems which plague racial minorities in
America or to satisfy fully the demands of social justice in a modern
society.
A communal perspective regarding affirmative action also requires
a sophisticated examination of the harm inflicted upon members of the
racial majority. In most cases, that harm consists in the denial of a
financial or material benefit.18 5 The denial of such a short-term bene-
fit is not equivalent to being subjected to individual or cultural deri-
181. See supra notes 8-18 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
183. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 296 (1986)(Marshall, J. dis-
senting)("I, too, believe that layoffs are unfair. But unfairness ought not be con-
fused with constitutional injury.").
184. Any parent is painfully aware that fairness is the recurring argument of children
who have been denied a "benefit."
185. The harm in all of the Supreme Court cases discussed is properly characterized
as financial. In a long-term perspective, this harm cannot be perceived as out-
weighing the values supporting redress of societal discrimination-even Bakke
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sion based on race.18 6 The Court should remain vigilant to invalidate
governmental action which is, in fact, based upon disrespect for an
individual's or a group's race. However, if such disrespect is not actu-
ally present, the unfairness of a lost financial opportunity should not
be allowed to limit a legislative body's ability to reverse 200 years of
societal discrimination.187 The denial of a benefit will, to a certain
extent, undermine the "Nation's commitment" to judge people based
on individual merit.158 But that "commitment" was never truly fol-
lowed in a capitalistic society and was certainly never applied to racial
minorities for most of the Nation's existence.18 9 A society based on
communal values possesses the maturity to acknowledge that some
perceived unfairness, particularly from a short-term perspective, will
always exist and the self-esteem to believe that such unfairness is tol-
erable if justified in the context of long-term communal best interests.
The Court's emphasis on a remedial justification for affirmative ac-
tion decisions, motivated at heart by the primacy of fairness, has also
confused the legislative and judicial function. By insisting that af-
firmative action can only be invoked to remedy proven or admitted
past discrimination, the Supreme Court has denied a legislative body
the ability to legislatel9o and has mandated that legislatures perform
the judicial function of deciding guilt and imposing penalty.191 The
remedial analysis has also failed to differentiate between constitution-
ally mandated activity and constitutionally permissible action. If a
governmental body had been guilty of racial discrimination, the Four-
teenth Amendment mandates that such discrimination be effectively
remedied.192 The primacy of fairness has demanded that this re-
received admittance to another Medical School. See supra notes 79-83 and ac-
companying text.
186. This notion is similar to Justice Brennan's concept of stigma in Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 356-62 (1978)(Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), and Justice Stevens' insights regarding exclusion
and inclusion in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 316-17 (1986)(Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
187. The concern that a group might need governmental assistance to succeed, noted
as a stereotype in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978),
would not appear to be disrespect for race. An individual or group needing assist-
ance should never be a cause for embarrassment or shame, especially after 200
years of victimization by governmentally sanctioned discrimination.
188. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
189. Many financial benefits and opportunities are distributed in a capitalistic society
with no regard for merit, wealth usually being a more important criterion. See
Jewell, supra note 28.
190. This function can best be described as balancing various interests and values to
create substantive law. See Brilmayer, supra note 48.
191. See Justice Stevens' opinion in Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 513-
14 (1989)(Stevens, J., concurring).
192. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). These rem-
edies may clearly include race based judicial orders.
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quired redress of a constitutional wrong serve as a limitation on con-
stitutionally permissible action to remedy a societal wrong. The
legislative body is constitutionally permitted to give voice to commu-
nal values and accept some short-term unfairness in order to provide a
long-term societal benefit. Affirmative action policies are clearly con-
sistent with constitutional mandates or they could not be permitted
even in the remedial context. The Court, through its interpretation of
fairness, has declared that these valid legislative actions are out-
weighed by the burden imposed on innocents in the non-remedial set-
ting. This result is particularly inapposite based on the inherent
limitations placed on a legislature's affirmative action activity by the
political process. Given the nature of the legislative process and the
acknowledged unfairness in the deprivation of a benefit, governmental
action implementing affirmative action policies will not be lightly con-
sidered and will almost certainly be the least restrictive alterna-
tive.193 Once the legislative body has performed its constitutionally
permissible task of implementing communal values, the judiciary
should limit its inquiry to the analysis of whether any actual disre-
spect for race is present in the action at issue.194
The Court's recent opinion in Adarand reflects the limits of the
fairness rationale. The Court's formulation of the three principles of
skepticism, consistency and congruence is itself the product of exces-
sive generalization and superficiality.195 The skepticism analysis
overlooks the political reality that any burden imposed by the major-
ity upon itself has already been reviewed in detail by voters and their
accountable representatives. The consistency argument simply as-
sumes the answer to the question posed by affiumative action cases-
does the standard change depending on the race of the burdened?-
and substitutes catch phrase superficiality for value directed balanc-
ing. Finally, the congruence emphasis distorts Boling's values in-
spired holding, that not subjecting Congress to an equal protection
integration mandate would be unthinkable, into an excuse for ignor-
ing the different constitutional status distinguishing Congress from
state legislatures. The Court's devotion to the fairness construct then
dictates that this reasoning be precedentially justified by overruling
Metro Broadcasting and ignoring Fullilove.196 The Court therefore
persists in applying the dictates of fairness and its harmful conse-
quences in the affirmative action setting instead of a values based bal-
193. See Justice Marshall's opinion in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
310 (1986)(Marshall, J., dissenting).
194. See supra notes 101-102 and 128 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 59-78 and accompanying text.




ancing of competing interests necessary for the achievement of true
racial equality.
V. CONCLUSION
If the United States is a community, its culture possesses a shared
moral and philosophical tradition which will define its communal val-
ues. In America, these values include empathy, self-sacrifice and a
willingness to suffer short-term disadvantage for long-term gain.1 97
The legal system must return fairness to its proper role-the commit-
ment to be fair within the context of other more important values. In
this perspective, materialism and individualism, encouraged by the
primacy of fairness, will be subordinated to communal values and the
communal good.198 The restored primacy of these values, the true mo-
tivation for the civil rights movement, will inform an enlightened legal
analysis of affirmative action issues and will provide a foundation for
the implementation of meaningful social justice in America.
In conclusion, I leave the esoteric new frontiers to others. I ask only that
we resurrect our national spirit of compassion, of fairness, of obligation to
others less fortunate, and that we end, once and for all, this ten year old era of
selfishness, insensitivity, and smug self satisfaction-the "I got mine, and if
you weren't so lazy or shiftless, you'd have gotten yours" mentality. Let us
return to the time not so long ago when government cared about people, and
when society and the courts cared about justice, about equality, about ending
our greatest national shame: the effects of generations of racial discrimina-
tion. Our legal system has gone through similar times of racial insensitivity
before, such as the era of Dred Scott and Plessy v. Ferguson, and we have come
out of those eras resilient. When one branch of government falters, others
tend to take over. The job will not be done by one thousand-or even one
million-points of light. It can be done, however, by a compassionate and fair-
minded government with the help and support of a decent American
people. 199
197. See supra notes 33-34 and 55 and accompanying text.
198. The personal nature of constitutional rights (noted for example supra note 96 and
accompanying text) does not necessarily mean the glorification of individualism.
Personal rights and respect for individuals can exist within a community which
values long-term societal best interests. See supra note 27 and accompanying
text. Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. suggests that, given America's abundant resources, an
increased sharing among individuals may be enough to establish social justice
within our community. See VONNEGuT, supra note 35, at 88.
199. Reinhardt, supra note 56, at 148-49.
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